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ThE hISTORICAl TRAjECTORy Of fIjIAN POwER
Fiji’s army-backed interim regime is an 
organisation of indigenous Fijian power 
that paradoxically has been forged 
against supposed threats to the military 
and the multi-ethnic nation from Fijian 
ethnic extremism. It starkly highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between 
potentially accommodative institutional 
expressions of Fijian power and excluding 
Fijian nationalism. This difference is a feature 
of Fiji’s political development that can be 
traced back over many decades to the times 
of Apolosi Nawai and Ratu Lala Sukuna. This 
paper examines episodes in the trajectory of 
Fijian power from those times to the present. 
Fiji’s problem in political development has 
been in large part the dilemma of how to 
institutionalise Fijian political pre-eminence 
in a way that neutralises the aggressive 
nationalist potential. Could a constitutional 
provision for a role for the army in the political 
system achieve this objective where other 
approaches have failed without entailing a 
deepening entrenchment of vested interests 
that typically accompanies prolonged military 
interventions? 
INTRODUCTION
A dialectical process has driven 
transformations in indigenous Fijian political 
leadership from late colonial times to the 
present  -  a process centring on the assertion 
and containment of Fijian nationalism, and 
the significance of institutional forms of 
Fijian power for this containment. Several 
paramount Fijian chiefs constrained and 
exploited this potential in building their 
collective political leadership in the lead-up 
to Fiji’s independence. It is Fijian nationalism, 
the militant demand of “Fiji for the Fijians”, 
that has, since 1987, brought the army 
into the political arena,  just as it was 
primarily this nationalism that gradually 
undermined the political leadership of the 
high chiefs. One body of indigenous Fijian 
power has replaced another, both founded 
in late colonial institutions that established 
indigenous Fijian power in the state: the 
chiefly bureaucratic and political elite shaped 
in the Fijian Administration, and the officers 
of the Royal Fiji Military Forces (some of 
them chiefs).   
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For all Commodore Bainimarama’s 
rhetoric about his vision of a “non-racial” Fiji, 
the most significant fact about his army-based 
regime is its being the strongest expression 
of indigenous Fijian power. Commentators 
have remarked on the striking irony in this: 
the marriage, initially, of the major institutional 
construction of Fijian power, with leaders 
of the group, the Fiji Labour Party, that had 
been viewed by most Fijians as embodying 
the long-feared threat of Indo-Fijian political 
domination. The supreme apparatus of Fijian 
power proposing to fulfil a vision of Fiji that 
had long been diametrically opposed to 
the dominant Fijian political leadership and 
ideology.
The army which had once overthrown 
the progressive Labour Party/NFP coalition 
government, and its ideology, came eventually 
to adopt that ideology in alliance with the 
Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry 
and two of his lieutenants.  The Labour 
Party men have since left the regime. But 
their universalist ideology rejecting political 
communalism and indigenous paramountcy 
remains the regime mantra, including 
particularly a determination to introduce the 
common franchise, the prospect of which 
Fijians had once been encouraged by their 
leaders to fear as the greatest threat to their 
security.
Fiji’s modern political history is replete 
with ironies, particularly since the first coups 
- beginning with the Labour Party leaders’ 
support for Rabuka’s successful bid for the 
office of prime minister (against a Fijian rival) in 
the first elections under the 1990 constitution 
(Rabuka had promised concessions that he 
later resisted fulfilling).  The Labour Party 
had been the spearhead of the coalition 
that Rabuka overthrew at gunpoint after its 
victory in the 1987 elections. Twelve years 
later, the Labour Party won government 
with the support of Fijian nationalist groups 
that opposed Rabuka’s agreement to liberal 
constitutional reform which they viewed as 
a betrayal of his coup objectives. Rabuka 
had hoped for a return to power in alliance 
with Jai Ram Reddy, another of the Indian 
leaders he had ousted in 1987, but who 
ten years later worked closely with him for 
constitutional reform. Ratu Mara, whose rule 
had been overturned by Mahendra Chaudhry 
and colleagues in the election of 1987, 
was now pleased, as President, to anoint 
Chaudhry as prime minister following his 
1999 electoral victory over Rabuka.  Such 
paradoxical twists testify to the intriguing 
flexibilities that mark Fiji’s political life despite 
the starkly contrasting visions of the nation 
that have divided the main political parties.
There have been three paradigms for nation 
making in Fiji:
The ethno-nationalist: An aggressive 1. 
assertion of the indigenous Fijian claim 
of their right to political power, allowing 
little representation to non-Fijians;  
Accommodative entrenchment of Fijian 2. 
political paramountcy, allowing substantial 
representation to others; 
The liberal-democratic: a common 3. 
franchise and full equality of the citizens; 
emphasis on economic and other shared 
interests cutting across the ethnic divide 
- affirming the importance of class rather 
than race or ethnicity. 
Rabuka’s two coups championed the first 
of these visions in opposition to the third 
Bainimarama’s coup-based interim regime 
champions the third against the first, albeit 
within the context of supreme institutional 
Fijian power. The key to this paradox is the 
threat that Fijian nationalism came to pose 
to the integrity and political independence of 
the military institution itself, and personally to 
its commander. 
The current army-backed regime highlights 
the importance of distinguishing between 
potentially accommodative institutional 
expressions of Fijian power and antagonistic 
excluding Fijian nationalism. This difference 
is a feature of Fiji’s political development that 
can be traced back over many decades to 
the times of millenarian Fijian leader Apolosi 
Nawai and comprador colonial high chief 
Ratu Lala Sukuna. 
After Sukuna and fellow chiefs encouraged 
the colonial governor to keep the “disaffected 
native” Apolosi in exile on the island of 
Rotuma, Sukuna eventually became the 
founder of the chiefly bureaucratic-political 
elite whose successors were to dominate 
the national political stage from the late 
1960s until the first coup d’etat in 1987.  In 
this paper I want to retrace the development 
of this chiefly political elite, its attempt to 
achieve a multi-ethnic vote base, its fateful 
conflict with militant Fijian nationalism, how 
the chiefs’ electoral defeat and the nationalist 
response became the crucible for the army’s 
political interventions, and the warriors’ 
replacement of the chiefs (albeit with some 
high chiefly support) as the Fijian substance 
of the state.  
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Since late colonial times it has been 
widely believed by indigenous Fijians that 
state power should above all protect them, 
that the ending of colonial rule should return 
sovereignty to them, and that this right is 
enshrined in the relationship with the British 
Crown established by the Deed of Cession 
by which leading chiefs gave their islands 
to Britain in 1874. It was a conviction that, 
although partly encouraged by them, began 
to greatly trouble senior British officials in 
Fiji in the last few years of their rule. The 
Secretary for Fijian Affairs remarked in a 
confidential despatch to London in 1962: 
“There is still a feeling among the Fijians 
that the Governor belongs to them, and that 
he personally, or through his British officers, 
looks after them first and foremost, and that 
they are not interested in what happens to the 
others”1.  Governor Jakeway later reinforced 
the assessment: “There is an element of 
racial arrogance in the Fijian makeup which 
must be reckoned with. He really does 
regard this country as belonging to him…The 
Fiji Intelligence Committee has placed first 
amongst possible internal security threats, 
the withdrawal of loyalty by the Fijians in 
consequence of doubts as to whether the 
British Government is adequately looking 
after their interests…”2.   
Anthropologist Andrew Strathern once 
suggested to me that perhaps we might think 
of the chiefs as being, or having been, in Fijian 
understanding, consubstantial with the state. 
If this is so, no institutional arrangement could 
more strongly reinforce such a conviction than 
the Fijian Administration as it was established 
in 1944 near the end of the Pacific war, and 
as it shaped the chiefly political elite that led 
Fijians through decolonisation and long after. 
Much of the story is well-known to students 
of Fiji history. But there are some less familiar 
aspects that are illuminating on the relation of 
this institutional arrangement of Fijian power 
to Fijian nationalism.
ExIlE AND EMPOwERMENT- 
CONTROllING ThE EARly 
NATIONAlISTS
Ratu Sukuna and Apolosi Nawai are 
the two most outstanding indigenous Fijian 
leaders of the colonial era, both of them 
powerful intellects and personalities. We 
know much about Sukuna, thanks especially 
to Deryck Scarr’s work3, but the record 
on Apolosi remains largely confined to 
confidential files in the Fiji national archives, 
a book-length biography in Japanese by 
anthropologist Naoki Kasuga,  and papers 
by Ratu Sukuna, Timothy MacNaught, and 
Charles Weekes4.  Throughout the colonial 
era and even for some years after, there 
was a tight restriction on research access to 
the Apolosi files. This fact, and his several 
forced exiles under a “disaffected natives” 
law, are compelling evidence of the colonial 
government’s and the leading Fijian chiefs’ 
apprehensions about him. Apolosi continued 
to trouble the colonial officials and the 
leading chiefs through his emissaries, and 
he inspired radical Fijian groups long after his 
death in 19465. 
Apolosi had tried to promote indigenous 
Fijian participation in the business economy 
by organising the Viti Kabani (Fiji Company) 
to supervise the harvesting and marketing of 
copra and bananas, independently of non-
Fijian traders. He sold shares to thousands 
of village people throughout the colony, and 
began to challenge the colonial authorities 
and to encourage Fijians to look forward 
to the coming of a “new era” when they 
would prosper and rule their own land. 
The Viti Kabani was a nascent nationalist 
movement. 
During Apolosi’s second exile (1929-
1939), Ratu Sukuna, then emerging as by 
far the most able and forceful of the chiefs 
in his dealings with the colonial officials, 
helped them to establish a central authority 
to manage the leasing out of Fijian clan land 
to Indian sugar cane farmers; (the Australian 
CSR Co. controlling the sugar industry, and 
Mahatma Gandhi’s emissary C.F.Andrews, 
had pressured the governor to do this, to 
resolve the problem of insecurity of tenure 
and Fijian bribery6).  Sukuna’s achievement 
in persuading the Fijian provincial councils 
and the Council of Chiefs to agree to the 
reform was acclaimed by the British officials 
as “perhaps the greatest act of trust and 
statesmanship in colonial history”7.  Apolosi, 
through his emissaries, criticised “the 
haughty chief” for compromising Fijian land 
interests.8
Yet within two years, on the eve of World 
War II, British officials began to fear that 
Sukuna himself might become a “disaffected 
native”.  He had nursed a grievance over white 
racialism since the British army rejected on 
colour grounds his attempt in 1914, while a 
student at Oxford, to recruit for the European 
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war. He then joined the French Foreign 
Legion, fought with outstanding courage in 
France, and returned a hero to Fiji, to resume 
a career in administration.  
European race discrimination prevailed 
in many contexts of social relations and 
employment in Fiji well into the 1950s. 
Anthropologist William Geddes, who served 
with the New Zealand army in Fiji during 
the Pacific war, wrote that at least before 
the war “there was an effective colour bar 
and fraternizing was regarded askance by 
the white people”9; discrimination was also 
practised in many public contexts including 
hospitals and cinemas, public facilities such 
as toilets and swimming baths, and de 
facto residential zoning. Challengers of white 
racism were almost exclusively Indian leaders 
until the introduction in 1938 of a white/
coloured divide in the pay and conditions of 
the civil servants. The architect of this policy 
was a new colonial secretary transferred from 
Africa, Juxon Barton, a man with pronounced 
racialist attitudes who was opposed to even 
the leading Fijian chiefs fraternising with 
Europeans in Suva clubs. Legend tells that 
Sukuna, one of the rare non-Europeans 
admitted to the clubs, once overheard Barton 
refer to him there as a “nigger”10.  
For two years Sukuna and his several 
fellow chiefs in the colonial parliament united 
with the Indian politicians to oppose a range 
of government policies, but most especially 
the Public Service Reorganisation Act. 
The solidarity of the non-European leaders 
culminated in a petition to the Colonial Office, 
presented to the Governor Sir Harry Luke in 
February 1940, decrying the discrimination, 
calling for representation of Fijians and 
Indians in the Executive Council, and ending 
with a provocative implied suggestion of the 
risk, if the legislation was not repealed, of 
weakened loyalty of non-Europeans “at this 
critical juncture when the whole Empire is 
engaged in a life and death struggle”11.  The 
governor, and his superiors in London, were 
angered by the implication and disturbed 
about the possibility that the Fijians in the 
Legislative Council, led by Sukuna, might 
continue to unite with Indian leaders as part 
of a “a permanent opposition block”, rather 
than restrict themselves to specifically Fijian 
issues as the officials expected them to do. 
Sukuna’s anger was compounded by 
the proposal in the Reorganisation Act to 
absorb the administration of Native Affairs 
into the District Administration under the 
direct authority of British officials. This would 
complete a decline in the status and authority 
of Fijian chiefs in colonial government that 
had been ongoing for many years. In the 
Legislative Council, Sukuna spoke resentfully 
of the Fijian leaders’ feeling of “unrest and 
anxiety”. He declared that he wanted “to 
sound a note of warning, and to utter a 
reminder, that in the past we have had men 
here who laid down a Native policy that has 
produced a loyal Native race, and I would 
very much regret any policy that may, in the 
years to come, create difficulties between 
the Government and the Europeans, and 
the Indians and the Fijians”12.  Consideration 
was given to dealing with the problem of 
Sukuna’s disaffection by appointing him to 
the Executive Council, but he was initially 
opposed to this idea lest his position as Fijian 
leader be compromised, and in any case he 
was apparently disinclined to work with the 
most senior officials of the time (Luke and 
Barton)13.    
The Public Service Reorganisation 
legislation was repealed immediately after 
the war on instruction from London, the 
decision having been declared in the early 
1940s. But the episode had highlighted a 
simmering discontent, especially Sukuna’s 
independence and readiness to oppose the 
colonial authorities. By 1940 Sukuna was 
viewed as both the most important Fijian 
leader working with the colonial government, 
and a potential threat to it. Sir Arthur Richards, 
the Governor with whom, several years 
before, Sukuna had worked on the land 
reform, had resolved to assiduously cultivate 
his friendship, partly from an intuition that he 
could make “a very dangerous malcontent”14. 
Richards was long gone from Fiji, and soon 
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour 
his successor, Sir Harry Luke, for whom 
Sukuna had little respect, was replaced by an 
ex-military officer Sir Phillip Mitchell following 
complaints from the American and NZ army 
commanders based in Fiji that Luke was 
incompetent to collaborate effectively with 
them15. 
Mitchell came to Fiji direct from service in 
east  Africa where he had governed Tanganyika 
and Uganda with a fervent opposition to the 
racialism prevalent among white settlers and 
officials, and a determination to promote 
African leaders into positions of authority to 
prepare them for eventual self government16. 
His well-known capacity for “sympathetic 
native administration” influenced the decision 
to appoint him to Fiji.  Soon after settling in 
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Suva, he wrote to a Colonial Office friend 
that he perceived “a rather nasty touch 
of racialism about the place” and believed 
that Fijians and Indians “were beginning to 
think that they should make common cause 
against the Europeans”17. 
Mitchell’s desire to give indigenous leaders 
authority and responsibility would counter 
this trend. The war crisis provided compelling 
opportunities for such appointments, and 
Sukuna, in particular, was a leader of great 
ability and ambition. Mitchell’s relationship 
with the aggrieved chief, quite improbable 
but for the Pacific war, produced a powerful 
synergy of like minds: Sukuna was exactly 
the kind of native leader Mitchell wanted to 
empower and Mitchell was just the colonial 
governor Sukuna wished for.  
Mitchell’s primary task was to support 
the American and New Zealand forces and 
to prepare the colony against the threat of 
invasion. For this the cooperation of the 
chiefs was essential. Sukuna was appointed 
to the War Council and delegated the 
responsibility of mobilising a Fijian labour 
corps and recruiting Fijians for commando 
training and the foundation of the modern 
Fijian army.  He had quickly become a 
close adviser to Mitchell and during the war 
crisis the two planned a reconstruction of 
the system of Fijian village and province 
administration, originally established by Fiji’s 
first governor. As mentioned, subsequent 
governors had been downgrading it, passing 
local authority from Fijian chiefs to British 
district commissioners and officers, often 
much younger than the chiefs. Mitchell’s 
enthusiasm, at this moment when the chiefs’ 
loyalty was so critical, was all for empowering 
the indigenous leaders. This the new Fijian 
Administration achieved. Modelled partly 
on Mitchell’s reforms in Tanganyika, it was 
established in 1945, strengthening official 
chiefly authority in the villages and taking 
paternalistic control over the thousands of 
ex-servicemen and labourers now restless 
with new ideas and aspirations gained from 
their wartime friendships with Americans and 
New Zealanders.
It might seem to be going too far to 
suggest that on the eve of the Pacific war 
there was an emerging potential for an 
anti-colonial nationalism in Fijian political 
leadership. Yet Mitchell himself apparently 
saw such a potential, for in justifying his 
proposal in a lengthy despatch to London 
in 1943, he argued (inter alia): “In Fiji, as 
at present organised, Fijians have strong 
political representation in the Legislative 
Council, and an advisory Council of Chiefs. 
But no direct responsibility or authority at all. 
This is lop-sided, and if it does not produce 
irresponsible nationalism or racialism, it will 
be surprising”18.  The very success of the 
new structures in establishing indigenous 
Fijian control in many spheres of life, and in 
nurturing an exceptionally strong and self-
possessed political leadership during the last 
two decades of colonial rule, perhaps blinkers 
our view of the nature of that historical 
moment in the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
its conflicting tendencies and possibilities.    
Sukuna’s Fijian Administration was to 
become infamous in much academic 
literature, in many official reports, and in 
political rhetoric, as a reactionary obstacle to 
attempts by colonial officials in the 1950s and 
1960s to encourage much-needed changes. 
In Sukuna’s view, the Fijian “remained very 
much a subsistence village cultivator at heart 
enjoying the peace and leisure of the koro”19 
and he wished to keep things that way as far 
as possible. Yet Mitchell had regarded the 
reform as only a necessary transitional phase, 
and not “a policy of segregation”. He viewed 
it as likely to help build Fijian confidence 
and ability in preparation for participation in 
the wider economy; he expected “all race 
differentiation to disappear in a place like Fiji 
in a generation or two”20. 
The Mitchell-Sukuna reform gave greater 
authority to the high-ranking chiefs than they 
had ever enjoyed before in the colonial order, 
within a framework of tightly related official 
bodies. It was a complete reversal of the 
trend in “Native” administration before the 
war.  The Council of Chiefs selected the six 
Fijian members of the colonial parliament, 
who then (ex officio) formed the core of the 
Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) which oversaw 
rule-making and many of the appointments 
in the local administration. The FAB was, 
in effect an, “executive committee” of the 
Council of Chiefs21. The Secretary for Fijian 
Affairs, initially Sukuna, chaired the FAB and 
was a member of the Executive Council (the 
governor’s cabinet); thus Sukuna became 
the first non-European appointed to the 
supreme governing body. The FAB members 
also predominated on the Native Lands Trust 
Board22. 
As this nexus of authoritarian institutional 
Fijian power was consolidated in the 1950s, 
the Royal Fiji Military Forces, too, was growing 
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in strength and importance as a mainly Fijian 
body, from its beginnings in the Pacific 
war. There were links with the political and 
administrative elite: Ratu Edward Cakobau, 
Ratu George Cakobau, Ratu Penaia Ganilau, 
and Ratu Sukuna himself had all been army 
men. Many other men appointed to the 
new administration over the next 20 years 
had also seen military service, either in the 
Pacific war or in the Malayan campaign ten 
years later. 
The bureaucratic-political formation of the 
Fijian Administration, conceived by Mitchell 
partly as a means to avert the possibility 
of “a dangerous racialism or nationalism”, 
encouraged a strengthening confidence in 
Fijian leaders of their status and power, 
their conviction of entitlement to privileged 
position in the colonial state. Indeed the Fijian 
bureaucracy in the period 1945-1960 took on 
the shape almost of “a state within a state”23. 
Contributing to the conviction of entitlement 
to power was a heightening of ethnic tension 
after the war as Indians became a majority of 
the population, strengthened their positions 
in the economy, and called increasingly for 
more lease access to Fijian-owned land.   
By the late 1950s, British officials in Fiji 
were troubled not just by the Council of 
Chiefs’ resistance to accepting a responsibility 
to facilitate progressive change in respect 
to land utilisation and the introduction of 
adult Fijian franchise, but by an increasing 
tendency to “separatism even isolationism” 
on the part of the Fijian bureaucratic-political 
elite24. Governor Maddocks informed London 
in 1961 of how “the fortress mentality of the 
Fijians” was impeding progress in his talks 
with them about the need for constitutional 
reform25. 
Sir Alan Burns, an outsider, vividly summed 
up the situation as he saw it in his briefing of 
the Colonial Office heads late in 1959, soon 
after returning from his commissioned study 
of population and land problems. Just over a 
year since Sukuna’s death, Burns confided 
his view that “Fiji has not been governed in 
the last 10 years, except by Lala Sukuna, 
and has got completely out of hand”. The 
senior British officials in Fiji, he claimed, 
dared not interfere in Fijian affairs. Indeed, 
some had become “more Fijian than the 
Fijians”, while the appointed Fijian political 
leaders “controlled the whole situation [of 
Fijian affairs]”26.  
The reactionary solidarity of the Fijian 
political leaders was reinforced by the critical 
review produced by Burns, the even more 
critical report by the geographer Oscar 
Spate a year before, and by the British 
officials’ announcement in 1961 of their plan 
to prepare Fiji for self-government27.  Fiji 
is perhaps the only place in the annals of 
colonial rule in modern times where the 
dominant indigenous leaders initially desired 
to cling defensively to colonial protection as 
the colonial rulers prepared to leave. 
The Fijian anti-colonial nationalist 
potential, embryonic in 1940, was given a 
constrained and regulated expression in the 
new Fijian Administration which fulfilled the 
chiefs’ frustrated aspirations for official status 
and authority. Their much strengthened 
position, now very much a part of the state, 
depended on colonial institutions. But, more 
importantly, they believed that the ending of 
British rule would bring the threat of Indian 
political domination, especially if the electoral 
system was changed from communal to 
common franchise. 
The British soon abandoned their initial 
hope to move Fiji to a common electoral 
franchise, fearing that an attempt to impose 
this radical change from communal rolls 
would alienate the Fijian leaders, who might 
draw on the support of the many indigenous 
Fijians in the army and police, thereby 
creating “the prospect of a very dangerous 
security situation in which we might not be 
able to protect the Indians and Europeans” 
28.
It was in this context of looming and, 
in their view, potentially threatening 
constitutional change that Fijians were at last 
given the full adult franchise; (until 1963 their 
representatives in the Legislative Council 
were chosen by the Council of Chiefs). The 
chiefly bureaucratic-political elite had now 
to move its support base from the Council 
of Chiefs and the bureaucracy to popular 
electoral politics - from being paternalistic 
overseers of village life increasingly viewed 
by ordinary Fijians as impediments to 
personal freedom, to ethnic champions and 
protectors as Sukuna’s restrictive system 
was liberalised in the late 1960s with the 
guidance of Fijian anthropologist Rusiate 
Nayacakalou.29 
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fIjIAN NATIONAlIST ASPIRATIONS 
AND INTER-EThNIC AllIANCE
The watershed of the early to mid 1960s 
was the most significant moment of nascent 
Fijian nationalism since the era of Apolosi 
Nawai.  There was a suspicious, defensive 
and sometimes hostile solidarity in the chiefly 
establishment, led by Sukuna’s political heirs: 
Ratu Mara, Ratu Edward Cakobau, Ratu 
George Cakobau, and Ratu Penaia Ganilau - 
the “big four”, as the Fiji press liked to refer to 
them.  They were joined on the political stage 
by several young men, some not of chiefly 
rank, just home from tertiary studies in the 
UK where they had met African students who 
enthused over their countries’ achievement 
of independence. These men had returned 
home with the mantra “Fiji for the Fijians” 
strongly in mind: If the British were to leave 
Fiji, they must do so only with the Fijians 
firmly in control.
The Fijian Association, a small body then 
confined mainly to Suva, was made the vehicle 
for new political organisation and mass voter 
mobilisation30.  The chiefly establishment and 
the budding young nationalists argued at 
committee meetings about political strategy. 
Racialist ideas and sentiments were often 
voiced at public rallies chaired by paramount 
chiefs, including Ratu Mara who was soon 
made the Association’s president. In public 
these chiefs joined the chorus for Fijian 
political paramountcy, but most (especially 
Mara) were soon counselling their young 
colleagues on the need to have non-Fijian 
support if they were to achieve control of 
government; the chiefs were themselves 
being advised about this necessity by the 
then Secretary for Fijian Affairs, Archie Reid, 
and other British officials. Subduing the 
militant nationalist mood was made easier for 
Mara by the death in 1964 of the charismatic 
political leader, Ravuama Vunivalu, a civil 
servant of modest traditional rank who had 
influenced the thinking of Mara’s younger 
Association colleagues.    
Mara began to hone his skills in managing 
and accommodating under his leadership, two 
conflicting political pressures:  the emerging 
nationalist mood and the imperative to secure 
inter-ethnic alliance to counter the then 
major political body, the almost exclusively 
Indian Federation Party31.  By 1966 he was 
leading the Alliance Party, a coalition that 
included several Indian groups as well as 
Europeans, Part-Europeans, Chinese, and 
Rotumans, but depended mainly on the 
Fijian Association with its village branches 
proliferating throughout Fiji.  “The Alliance is 
for all, and all are for the Alliance!” its leaders 
assured their multi-ethnic audiences in the 
towns. The party, they promised, would secure 
peace, stability, and prosperity by insisting on 
the preservation of the communal system of 
political representation in recognition of Fijian 
fear that a common franchise would bring 
Indian political domination32. 
At the Fijian village gatherings, however, 
the rhetoric was emphatically and defensively 
nationalist. The central message was that 
through the Alliance Party, led by the “big 
four” paramount chiefs, Fijians would be 
assured of holding state power when the 
British left. Should the common franchise 
come to Fiji, as demanded by the Federation 
Party, that party would surely win government 
and change the laws protecting Fijian lands 
and culture. The Alliance Party would prevent 
this from happening.  
The principal Association campaigner, an 
urbane young former civil servant, explained 
to me at that time that “we must tell the Fijians 
what we believe they want to hear”: “We 
must tread very carefully for we are not yet 
confident that the Alliance Party concept will 
be accepted”. In recounting to Fijian village 
audiences the history of the Association, he 
explained that it had been feared that the 
Indians might one day “attack” the Fijians: 
“[With the Fijian Association] we would be 
ready to fight them, defeat them, and throw 
them into the sea”33.  He was careful in 
his village oratory to distinguish between 
the Federation Party Indians who allegedly 
posed the threat, and the few Indians who 
supported the Alliance Party. After such 
campaign meetings he would return home 
to Suva where he regularly socialised in the 
Union Club with Indian friends.
Thus Mara, Sukuna’s protégé, played a 
dangerous political double game: courting 
support for his Alliance Party from a variety 
of non-Fijian leaders and organisations 
(including Indian businessmen, professionals, 
and farmers’ leaders), drawing partly from the 
experience and contacts of his several years 
as a district officer in predominantly Indian 
areas,  and simultaneously encouraging and 
exploiting the fears of indigenous Fijians in 
both villages and towns by the ethnocentric 
campaign rhetoric of his Fijian Association 
lieutenants. 
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Yet it would be mistaken to understand this 
behaviour simply as a cynical manipulation 
of popular sentiment. Although Mara was 
the least conservative of the paramount 
chiefs, he was certainly ready to allow rein 
to Fijian nationalist emotions when it suited 
him. But the force of Fijian ethnocentrism 
and suspicion about constitutional change 
was very real, and Mara had to contend with 
colleagues in leadership who were far more 
personally identified with this mood than he 
was. The first Fijian Association submission 
to the Colonial Office on constitutional 
change called for a guarantee of Fijian 
political dominance. This was the demand 
that Mara’s younger colleagues, particularly, 
had been aggressively voicing and one which 
would return to challenge him soon after 
Fiji achieved Independence. Mara arranged 
for the Colonial Office visitors to hear the 
submission in the absence of himself and the 
other senior chiefs, so that the young men 
would feel freer to express their views.  
Nationalist sentiments were kept simmering 
by Fijian Association campaigners. Just two 
years before independence they almost 
flared into violent ethnic conflict following 
Mara’s Alliance Party defeat in by-elections 
held for the Indian communal seats after a 
prolonged Federation Party boycott of the 
Legislative Council. An angry Mara removed 
to his remote Lau islands while the protests 
raged in anti-Indian street marches and 
rallies led by Fijian Association principals 
including the most ethnocentric of the “big 
four” chiefs, Ratu George Cakobau.  After 
two weeks of this highly volatile intimidation 
campaign, Mara returned to Suva and, with 
Ratu George, restored the calm34. 
Mara’s stature in the eyes of the British 
officials grew from his ability to both control 
and exploit Fijian nationalist sentiment, as 
well as his willingness to encourage Fijian 
leaders to make concessions to the interests 
of Indians and others, particularly regarding 
land35.  The paramount chiefs’ status in major 
official institutions, together with the strong 
cultural and structural social bonds with the 
majority of Fijians, gave them a political 
security that allowed them latitude to make 
compromises in inter-ethnic dialogue and 
negotiation - though not without considerable 
tensions in Council of Chiefs meetings.  Fiji 
achieved its Independence in 1970 largely 
on the basis of agreements reached with 
Indian leaders in such dialogue36. But 
ethno-nationalist pressure had sometimes 
threatened to overcome Mara’s control, and 
it was to intensify soon after independence, 
inhibiting his efforts to strengthen Indian 
support for his government. 
POST-COlONIAl fIjIAN 
NATIONAlISM
There was an echo of Apolosi’s movement 
in the first eruption of nationalist challenge to 
Ratu Mara’s leadership just four years after 
Independence.  The Fijian Nationalist Party 
(FNP) was formed by one of Mara’s cabinet 
colleagues: a commoner, Sakeasi Butadroka. 
Butadroka had broken with the Alliance 
to campaign for an opposing candidate in 
a by-election. Initially, his main grievance 
was Mara’s refusal to use his power as 
prime minister to promote Fijian ventures in 
business, in particular a provincial council 
bus company that Butadroka, as the council 
chairman, had helped establish. Mara was 
anxious to maintain the political allegiance 
of Indian bus proprietors who might resent 
new competition on major commuter routes. 
Butadroka denounced Mara and his political 
colleagues for failing the Fijians in the 
matter of their greatest need: economic 
development.  But worse, they had agreed to 
a constitution for independent Fiji that did not 
guarantee that Fijians would always control 
government37.  In his campaigning to build the 
Fijian Nationalist Party, Butadroka drew on 
the grass-roots organisation of the Methodist 
Church, as well as certain predominantly 
Fijian workers’ unions. His rhetoric became 
increasingly anti-Indian and he gave his 
support to Fijian village clans aggrieved over 
rent issues, encouraging and sometimes 
personally helping them to intimidate Indian 
farmer or business tenants in arrears. 
Ratu Mara’s fear of Butadroka’s power 
to erode support for the Fijian Association 
compelled him to turn away from his 
commitment to strengthen Indian support 
for the Alliance Party, which had grown to 
24% of Indian voters in 1972, but fell to 
just 14% in 1977 and after. Indeed it was 
largely Butadroka’s popularity that caused 
Mara’s electoral defeat in the first 1977 
elections; (the Alliance was quickly restored 
to power by the Governor General, Ratu Sir 
George Cakobau, when National Federation 
Party leaders procrastinated over forming a 
government)
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Mara’s vulnerability to the FNP contributed 
to his electoral defeat again in 1987, as 
evidenced in the sustained loss of Indian 
supporters disillusioned with the Alliance 
government over its perceived failures on 
land and other issues, including Mara’s 
reluctance to publicly condemn Butadroka, 
and in the defection of some Fijian voters to 
the new Labour Party (nearly 10% of Fijian 
communal votes) as well as to the FNP 
(though by then reduced to only 5% of the 
communal votes).  
The defeat of the Alliance Party highlighted 
the failure, after 20 years, of the chiefly 
political elite’s attempt to build their national 
leadership by wedding their Fijian power 
to a multi-ethnic support base.  The Taukei 
Movement that mobilised street marches 
and rallies after the elections resembled the 
protests provoked by the failure of Mara’s 
campaign to strengthen his Indian support 
in the by-elections campaign twenty years 
before. Prominent in the leadership of both 
movements were Mara’s lieutenants in the 
Fijian Association.
ThE ARMy COUPS Of 1987: 
SUPPORTING AND CONSTRAINING 
MIlITANT EThNO-NATIONAlISM38 
Events in the year following Sitiveni 
Rabuka’s overthrow of the new Labour 
Party- National Federation Party coalition 
government were marked by a sometimes 
conflicting interplay of several forces, centring 
on the issue of entrenching indigenous 
power: the army; the sometimes violent 
Taukei Movement whose leaders were mostly 
commoners but included several people of 
high chiefly rank; and chiefly authority in the 
form of the Great Council of Chiefs and the 
paramount chiefs  (defeated prime minister 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and governor-
general Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau) who, with 
Great Council of Chiefs support, had long 
held leadership of the state.
Rabuka became manager and mediator 
of these forces. The Great Council of Chiefs 
and the paramount chiefs were crucial 
political and cultural resources with which he 
endeavoured to control the extremists within 
and outside the army.  To secure legitimacy for 
his coup and restore stability, he endeavoured 
to bind Taukei Movement objectives to chiefly 
leadership. In fact, what was most significant 
about the popular response to the crisis 
was the way in which the old institutions 
and symbols of ethnic Fijian leadership 
helped to both articulate and control it, taking 
from Rabuka, for the most part with his 
encouragement, the function of asserting the 
ethnic claim and so limiting the independent 
power of the aggressive nationalists.
Rabuka’s first Council of Ministers, set 
up within days of the coup in the face 
of Ganilau’s opposition, was headed by 
Mara, and included many Taukei Movement 
leaders (some of them Mara’s Alliance 
Party colleagues). Rabuka next convened a 
meeting of the Great Council of Chiefs, which 
approved the coup and endorsed the Taukei 
Movement goal of changing the constitution 
to entrench Fijian control of government.
After the chiefs’ meeting, Ganilau 
capitulated and agreed to lead a new council 
including Mara and Rabuka, but fewer Taukei 
Movement activists than the first.  Later 
came meetings of the two paramount chiefs 
with Labour Party leader Timoci Bavadra, 
the overthrown Fijian prime minister. 
They eventually proposed a caretaker 
government, to be recruited equally from the 
Alliance Party and Bavadra’s Labour Party/ 
National Federation Party Coalition,  and 
headed by Ganilau. A Constitution Review 
Committee’s majority report to Ganilau had 
just endorsed the Great Council of Chiefs 
call for Fijian dominance. Yet the agreement 
reached in the bi-party talks for a new 
review of the constitution promised only to 
take “full account of Fijian aspirations for 
the betterment of their interests”. It made 
no reference to establishing Fijian political 
supremacy, but emphasised the need “to 
provide a framework for a multiracial society 
in which the rights and interests of all the 
communities are safeguarded”39.
Rabuka remained firm in his commitment 
to securing Fijian domination and yielded to 
demands from the militant Taukeists who 
were denouncing the bi-party agreement and 
threatening violence. The Taukei Movement, 
encouraged by sympathetic military officers, 
was by then playing a prominent part in 
the expansion of army recruitment, thereby 
strengthening its pressure on the coup maker. 
In a second coup, in late September, Rabuka 
again arrested Bavadra, pushed the two high 
chiefs aside, and appointed a new Council 
of Ministers, this time dominated by Taukei 
Movement leaders and army officers.
  The Historical Trajectory of Fijian Power
10 But pressure on Rabuka to turn back to 
the chiefs grew as his council foundered 
on a combination of impetuous personal 
ambitions, inexperience, and agendas for 
radical changes. Within three months he 
dismissed his ministers and persuaded 
Ganilau to accept appointment as President 
of the newly declared Republic of Fiji. Ganilau 
gave the office of prime minister to Mara who 
excluded most Taukei Movement leaders 
from yet another council and brought back 
some old Alliance Party colleagues. This 
interim government, including only three 
army men, endured with Mara’s leadership 
until parliament elections in 1992 under 
a new constitution securing Fijian political 
dominance and approved by the Great 
Council of Chiefs whose powers it greatly 
enhanced.
What most stood out in the turbulent 
events of 1987 was Rabuka’s endeavouring 
to control and mediate the different political 
forces. He initially relied on the Great Council 
of Chiefs and the two paramount chiefs for 
legitimacy and stability, later excluded them 
under pressure from the extremists, but 
eventually turned back to the chiefs when 
the Taukei Movement pressure threatened to 
overwhelm him.
The Taukei Movement had potential to 
grow as an independent force, reconstructing 
Fijian political leadership, for some of its 
leaders did want to marginalise the principal 
chiefs. But the militants were not able to 
sustain an aggressive ethnic movement 
independently of the ideology that affirmed 
the legitimacy of chiefly leadership. Chiefs 
and their councils continued to hold the 
cultural and political high ground throughout 
the crisis.  The ethnocentric government 
and constitution that resulted from Rabuka’s 
coups are thus more accurately understood 
as a constrained expression of a potential for 
a more oppressive ethno-nationalism, than 
as the unbridled triumph of that potential.
 
Mara and Ganilau prevailed over 
Rabuka for several years, in the face of 
his intermittent public opposition to their 
actions in government and his occasional 
warnings of the possibility of yet another 
coup. He was encouraged in his criticisms 
of the two principal chiefs by several Taukei 
Movement leaders whom Mara had excluded 
in selecting his cabinet.  At one point Rabuka 
and several fellow officers urged Mara and 
Ganilau to shelve their plans for returning 
Fiji to democratic government and instead 
to hand over authority to a military-based 
government for an indefinite period for the 
purpose of projects to advance indigenous 
Fijian economic development. The army men 
proposed to suppress political opposition 
and the trade union movement. It would 
have been an unbridled victory for the Taukei 
Movement. But Mara and Ganilau rejected 
the scheme and Rabuka accepted their 
refusal rather than risk again the dangerous 
volatility of nationalist adventurism40.
After continuing conflict with him over his 
support of Methodist Church militancy and 
workers’ and farmers’ industrial demands, 
Mara and Ganilau told Rabuka that he must 
either resign from cabinet, or give up his army 
command in return for office as a co-deputy 
prime minister. Rabuka eventually chose the 
second option, and Ganilau appointed a new 
army commander, Ratu Epeli Ganilau, his 
own son and Mara’s son-in-law. In staging 
his coup, Rabuka had usurped the previous 
commander, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, also a 
son-in-law of Mara and son of Ratu Edward 
Cakobau, another of the “big four” chiefs 
who had led Fiji to Independence. Ratu Epeli 
Ganilau’s appointment signified a return of 
the paramount chiefs’ direct influence in the 
army. Rabuka had relinquished his principal 
power base, and the Taukei Movement 
leaders no longer had an easy entry there, 
for apart from Ganilau’s appointment, a key 
Taukei Movement supporter, Colonel Pio 
Wong, had been pressured to leave the 
army. 
While Rabuka began to build his political 
career through the Great Council of Chiefs-
authorised SVT Party and popular elections 
- eventually as an inter-ethnic bridge builder 
- Ratu Epeli Ganilau embarked on a project 
of transforming the army by encouraging 
a professional ethos opposed to Fijian 
nationalist influence and a commitment to 
institutional interests. Some tension grew 
within the army under Ganilau’s leadership 
and that of his favoured successor Voreqe 
Bainimarama. This tension, compounded by 
the resentment of some officers at being 
passed over in the succession appointment, 
made the ethnic extremism of the 2000 crisis 
a threat to the army as an institution, and to 
the personal security of its new commander. 
For several months there was a danger 
of catastrophic internal power struggle, 
culminating in the very violent attempted 
mutiny and its suppression in November.  
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fIjIAN MIlITARy POwER fOR 
NATIONAl DEvElOPMENT ?
The course of political events after 2000 
can, to a large extent, be understood in terms 
of the insecurity and traumas experienced 
within the army during the prolonged crisis 
of 2000.  This crisis was the crucible for the 
evolution of the army as an independent 
political actor, just as the crisis created by 
the Taukei Movement in 1987 had been 
the springboard for the army’s first political 
intervention, then as an instrument for 
Taukeist objectives. It is yet another ironic 
twist in Fiji’s political development that Ratu 
Epeli Ganilau’s project to move the military 
away from the political arena, eventually 
clashed with Fijian nationalist initiatives in a 
way that encouraged his chosen successor 
to make the army into an even more strongly 
politically interventionist force than Rabuka 
had made it.
The army’s rhetoric in opposition 
to Laisenia Qarase’s government and in 
justification of the December 2006 coup has 
been about the protection and development 
of multi-ethnic Fiji. The army claims to have 
professional ability and a constitutional 
authority and responsibility to assume the role 
of guardian and guide for the nation against 
damaging and corrupt political leaders.  But 
the deeper imperative for the army’s actions 
has been less a direct concern for the 
well-being of the nation, and more a drive 
for self-preservation -  a determination to 
defend and strengthen the military itself as 
an autonomous corporate institution, and to 
preserve its present leadership, against the 
perceived continuing threat to its integrity 
from Fijian nationalist groups. The army 
quickly equated its self-preservation project 
with an agenda for national security and 
development, and made its claim to be 
“guardian of the nation” the rationale for its 
assertion of its institutional autonomy. The 
army’s resolve in these actions has been 
based in large part on its three decades 
experience in UN peacekeeping, and the 
material resources and specialised expertise 
which that work has helped to create41.
Since the 1960s the central problem for 
indigenous Fijian leadership has been that 
of reconciling the Fijian claim to a privileged 
right to state power - i.e. Fijian nationalist 
aspirations - with pressures for inter-
ethnic cooperation in political parties and 
government. This was Ratu Mara’s deepening 
dilemma in his ultimately failed attempt 
to build broad-based national leadership 
from the 1960s to the 1980s, and became 
Rabuka’s fateful problem during the 1990s 
as he endeavoured with Jai Ram Reddy to 
lead progressive constitutional change in the 
face of continued Fijian nationalism that he 
had encouraged. Attempts by Indian leaders 
to build broad-based political parties by 
appealing to economic and social interests 
cutting across the ethnic divide have also 
been unsuccessful, partly because their main 
commitment remained to attend to specifically 
Indian concerns. Rabuka’s electoral defeat by 
a mainly Indian-based coalition in 1999 was 
soon followed by a resurgence of a cynically 
manipulated Fijian nationalism and attempts 
by the army to contain and eventually to 
suppress it.
Over the last two decades, the 
consolidation of Fijian power in the state 
has shifted from the chiefs to the warriors, 
via crises of political and social disorder 
precipitated by militant nationalists. The 
Fijian experiment in national leadership had 
begun in the  1960s with the move by the 
leading chiefs from authoritarian paternalism 
in a bureaucratic organisation of ethnic 
power, to inter-ethnic electoral campaigning, 
a strategy for power that was soon under 
threat from nationalist rivals. Forty years 
later, Fijian nationalism and its associated 
intra-Fijian political rivalries provoked a 
reversion to authoritarian paternalism, again 
in a bureaucratic organisation of ethnic Fijian 
power, now physically coercive but claiming 
a mission of guardianship for the multi-ethnic 
nation. Fijians have long seen the army, to 
which so many have personal or family links, 
as the ultimate guarantor of their security and 
their power in the state. Ironically, in taking 
control of the state even more resolutely than 
in 1987, the army has suppressed the major 
institutions of popular Fijian identity and 
strength: Laisenia Qarase’s SDL party, the 
Great Council of Chiefs, and, most recently, 
the Methodist Church.
Yet, it is conceivable that, as an institution 
that can secure indigenous Fijian power 
against electoral uncertainties, the military 
might potentially have a function in helping 
to free the arenas of electoral politics and 
parliamentary government for inter-ethnic 
collaborations to an extent hitherto not 
possible.  It is, in any event, improbable 
that the army leaders will agree to a new 
constitution that does not entrench some 
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form of prerogative authority for them in the 
political system. It is perhaps also unlikely 
that the army, now with strengthening 
institutional, sectional, and personal interests 
in preserving power, would exercise such 
authority impartially. But hopefully it would at 
least, under changing leadership, maintain 
the opposition against ethnic chauvinism in 
political competition and government that 
Commodore Bainimarama has initiated.
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